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Recently properties of networks formed by economic agents have attracted
the attention of many researchers. There are various economic networks:
interconnections of airlines, telephone lines and Internet service providers.
Administrative organization of a firm and the industry structure describing
relation of firms are considered as information processing networks. Infor-
mal cooperate structure of free software developers (as in Linux) is another
example.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a
basic model of network formation. Section 3 discusses potential games and
refines a concept of Nash equilibrium. Section 4 analyzes an evolutionary
network formation process based on bounded rationality of players. Section
5 concludes.
2 Network Formation Game
In this section we describe the key notions of economic networks. Let $N=$
$\{1,2, \ldots N\}$ be the set of players. A network is represented by a graph $g$ in the
set $\mathcal{G}$ of all possible graphs. Every player $i$ simultaneously chooses a strategy,
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which specifies names of other players with whom he wishes to form links.
Formaly this is described by the vector $x_{i}’ \mathrm{s}$ with components
$x_{j}.\cdot=\{$
1 if $i$ wishes to form a link with $j$ ,
$0$ otherwise
We assume that a link between two players are actually formed iff they
both wish to form it. So we may describe the network $\gamma$ realized by a strategy
profile $x$ as follows:
$\gamma(x)=\mathrm{t}ij:\exists i,\exists j\mathrm{s}.\mathrm{t}$ . $X_{i}j=x_{j}.\cdot=1$ }.
When a network is formed, players get payoffs according to their position
in the network and their own strategies. Qin (1996) has also assumed the
same rules of network formation. Formally, player $i’ \mathrm{s}$ payoff function $\pi_{i}$ is
expressed as
$\pi_{i}(X)=V_{*}.(\gamma(_{X)})-c.\cdot(_{X}\dot{.})$,
where $V_{i}$ is player $i’ \mathrm{s}$ revenue function and $C_{i}$ is player $i’ \mathrm{s}$ cost function.
We assume that $C_{i}(xi)\geq 0$ for all $x_{i}$ and that $C_{i}(X.\cdot)$ is non-decreasing
with respect to $x_{i}$ . Let $N(g)=$ {$i\in N$ : $\exists j$ s.t $ij\in g$}. We assume that
$V_{i}(g)=V_{i}(g’)$ if $g’$ is a component of $g$ such that $i\in N(g’)$ .
We first observe the essential multiplicity of Nash equilibria (NE) of the
network formation games. Various network situations which have few com-
mon properties may be realized as Nash equilibria. In fact the following
proposition holds true.
Proposition 1.
(A) If $g$ is a NE network, its component $g’$ is also a NE network.
(B) If $g$ and $g’$ are NE networks and $N(g)\cap l\mathrm{V}(g’)=\emptyset,$ $g\cup g’$ is also a NE
network.
3 Potential Games
We describe two distinct ways of selecting equilibria; one is to choose po-
tential maximizing strategy profiles and the other is to choose evolutionary
equilibrium.
Potential games have been introduced by Monderer and Shapley (1996).
In a potential game, the set of strategy profiles which $1\mathit{0}$cally maximize its
potential function coincides with the set of all Nash equilibrium strategy
profiles of the game. Thus the strategy profiles which globally maximize its
potential function are the most robust Nash equilibria and so we adopt them
as the representatives.
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Definition 1. Monderer and Shapley (1996) Let $\Gamma(N, \{x_{:}\}i\in N, \{\pi_{1}\}i\in N)$
be a game in strategic form with finite players. The $s$et of players is $N=$
$\{1, 2, \ldots, N\}$ , the set of strategies of player $i$ is $X_{1}.$ , and the payoff function
of player $i$ is $\pi$: : $Xarrow R$. A function $P$ : $Xarrow R$ is a potential for $\Gamma$ if for
every $y_{-i}\in X_{-i^{1}}$
$\pi_{i}(x.\cdot,y-:)-\pi i(Zi,y-i)$ $=$ $P(_{X}:, y_{-*}.)-P(z\dot{.},y-\cdot.)$
for every $x_{i},$ $z_{i}\in X_{i}$ .
$\Gamma$ is called a potential game if it admits a potential.
Proposition 2. Monderer and Shapley (1996) LEMMA 2.1 Let $P$ be
a potential function for $\Gamma(N, \{X_{i}\}_{i\in}N, \{\pi_{i}\}_{i}\epsilon N)$ . Then the equilibrium set of
$\Gamma(N, \{x_{1}.\}_{iV}\in d’\{\pi_{1}.\}:\epsilon N)$ coincides with the equilibrium set $\Gamma(N, \{X_{i}\}_{i\in N}, \{P\}_{i\in}N)$ .
That is, $x\in X^{2}$ is an equilibrium point for $\Gamma$ if and only if for every $i\in N$
$P(x)\geq P(z_{1}., x_{-i})$ for every $z_{i}\in X_{i}$ .
With this concept, we analyze a unanimous game.
Example: Unanimous Game Every player $i$ must pay connection cost
$k(|X_{i}|)$ in all situations but can gain common revenue $V$ only when all players





1 if all players are connected in $\mathrm{g}$ ,
$0$ otherwise.
We show that if the connection cost function is concave (resp. convex) with
respect to the number of links, only a star3 (resp. line) network is realized
as potential $\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{Z}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}_{\circ}\sigma$ behavior. A star network and a line network are
depicted in figure 1.
Definition 2. A network $g\in \mathcal{G}$ is called a star if there exists $i\in N$ such
that
$g=$ {$ij:j\in N$ and $j\neq i$ }.
$1X_{-}i:=\mathrm{x}_{j}\in N\backslash \{i1Xj$ .
$2X:=\mathrm{x}_{j\epsilon N}X_{j}$ .
3We often call it a $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{b}$.
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Definition 3. A network $g\in \mathcal{G}$ is called a line if there exists a sequence
$i_{1},i_{2},$ $\ldots,i_{N}$ of distinct players and $g$ can be described as follows.
$g=\{i_{t}i_{t+1} : t=1,2, \ldots, N-1\}$ .
Proposition 3. (A) If $V$ is large enough and $k(n)-k(n-1)<k(n-$
$1)-k(n-2)$ for $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}n=2,3,$ $\ldots,$ $N-1$ , only star networks are realized by
the potential maximizing strategy profiles. (B) If $V$ is large enough and
$k(n)-k(n-1)>k(n-1)-k(n-2)$ for all $n=2,3,$ $\ldots,$ $N-1$ , only line
networks are realized by the potential maximizing strategy profiles.
4 Evolutionary Games
Evolutionary game theory presupposes bounded rationality of players. As in
Forster and Young (1990), Young (1993), Kandori, Mailth and Rob (1993),
and N\"oldeke and Samuelson (1993), we employ a stochastic mutation model.
In such a model, only strategy profiles which are most robust against mutants
are observed in the long run. In this paper, we additionally assume that
every player can observe only those players with whom he forms links. This
assumption describes the situation where the attentions of players are limited;
player’s search behaviors are restricted by his link strategies. In such a case,
we can establish the following proposition.
Definition 4. A non-empty network $g\in \mathcal{G}$ is called a hub if there exists a
star $f\in \mathcal{G}$ such that $g\subset f$ .
Proposition 4.
(A) The empty network is always a long-run equilibrium (LRE) network.
(B) The hub networks which are realized as NE are also contained in the set
of LRE. If no star network can be realized as a NE, the empty network
is the only LRE.
(C) If a maximal network $g$ is observed in a LRE, there exist a NE network
$f$ and a player $i$ which satisfy following conditions.
(C.1) $g\not\subset f$ .
(C.2) $g \backslash \bigcup_{ij\in g}\{ij\}\subset f\backslash \bigcup_{ik\in g}\{ik\}$ .
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.. (C.1) says that there is a player $i$ such that if we delete all links of player
$i$ from $g$ and $f$ , the former set is a subset of the latter.
5 Conclusions
We analyzed endogenous network formation problems where all players could
freely choose partners.
First we discussed the property of the essential multiplicity of Nash equi-
libria in the network formation games.
Second we refined the concept of Nash equilibrium in games with poten-
tials. A unanimous games was analyzed and showed that if the connection
cost function is concave (resp. convex), only a star (resp. line) network is
supported as a robust network.
Finally we studied an evolutionary network formation process where play-
ers have bounded rationality and pay limited attention. Three results were
obtained. (A) The empty network is always a LRE network. (B) NE hub
networks are always LRE networks, and their existence is necessary to the
existence of the other non-empty LRE networks. (C) Maximal LRE networks
should satisfy a certain selection condition as stated in Proposition 4.
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a star a line
Figure 1: a star and a line
88
